provided s t a t i s t i c a l consul t a t i o n and computer computation o f the t i m e -s e r i e s models.
A b s t r a c t
This paper develops a simul taneous time-series model t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e d a i l y i n t e r a c t i o n s between o f f i c i a l exchange-market i n t e r v e n t i o n and movements i n t h e deutschemark-doll a r exchange r a t e , from November 2, 1978, t o October 31, 1979, The model i s constructed using both morning-opening and afternoon-closing exchange-rate quotes. Using these two quotes, and making assumptions about the t i m i n g o f i n t e r v e n t i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h e exchange-rate quotes, enables us t o measure t h e causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s among contemporaneous
variables. The r e s u l t s suggest t h a t , over t h e p e r i o d i n v e s t i g a t e d , the Federal Reserve responded t o exchange-rate movements i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a 1 eaning-against-the-wind strategy, b u t t h a t t h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n tended t o accentuate s l i g h t l y movements i n t h e r a t e . This r e s u l t seems t o support claims t h a t t r a d e r s recognized i n t e r v e n t i o n and traded a g a i n s t it.

I. I n t r o d u c t i o n The major i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s abandoned t h e B r e t t o n Woods
fixed-exchange-rate system i n March 1973, a f t e r years o f unsuccessful attempts t o r e c t i fy i t s p e r s i s t e n t probl ems. Observers have characterized the subsequent exchange-rate regime as a " d i r t y f l o a t . " While t h e major i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s generally have allowed fundamental market forces t o determine t h e i r exchange rates, they p e r i o d i c a l l y have bought and sol d f o r e i g n exchange t o i n f l u e n c e the market outcome. The volume and frequency of exchange-market i n t e r v e n t i o n have v a r i e d g r e a t l y among the developed countries.
-2-In recent years, economists have beguri to question the efficacy of foreign-exchange-market intervention, especial ly i f intervention i s s t e r i l ized, and especial ly i f exchange markets are highly e f f i c i e n t (see Genberg 1981 ; Rogoff 1983; and Sol omon 1983) . Such concerns resul ted i n the U.S. decision of March 1981 to reserve intervention only for countering unusually large fluctuations i n the exchange markets (see Sprinkel 1980) .
Since that time, the United States has intervened on relatively few occasions. A t the Versailles summit meeting i n June 1982, many European governments c r i t i c i z e d the U. S. decision to cease routine intervention, arguing t h a t i t contributed t o increased, unnecessary vol a t i l i ty i n forei gn-exchange markets. A j o i n t study of intervention proposed a t the Versaill es summit meeting, however, 1 argely 1 e f t the questions unresol ved (see
Jurgensen 1 983).
This research investigates the short-term effectiveness of U.S. intervention i n the foreign-exchange market. Existing research generally does not support the view t h a t s t e r i l i z e d intervention has a long-term impact on the exchange rate, b u t researchers have not rejected the possibility of a near-term impact. Such an investigation involves answering two sets of questions. The f i r s t s e t of questions inquires about the Federal Reserve System's response to exchange-rate movements. Does the System buy (sell ) do1 1 a r s as the do1 1 a r depreciates (appreciates ) ? Does the Federal Reserve respond promptly to exchange-rate movements, or does i t respond w i t h a lag? A 1 agged response coul d imply greater exchange-rate vol a t i l i ty than a prompt response. Does the Federal Reserve respond to anticipated exchange-rate movements, or does i t respond only t o unanticipated exchange-rate movements? Does i t respond in a manner t h a t t h e market can anticipate? In a highly e f f i c i e n t exchange market, participants could predict and offset routine intervention.
The second s e t of questions inquires into the response of the exchange rate to the Federal Reserve System's intervention. Does an intervention purchase ( s a l e ) of dollars cause the dollar t o appreciate (depreciate), and how big i s any effect? The size of U.S. intervention could be too small relative t o the scope of the exchange market to have an appreciable e f f e c t on the exchange rate. If intervention does affect the exchange market, how long does the impact persist? Even a shock will die out quickly i n a highly efficient exchange market. This paper develops a simul taneous time-series model t o investigate the daily interactions between U. S. exchange-market intervention and the deutschemark-do1 1 a r exchange rate from November 2, 1978, t o October 31 , 1979.
By incorporating both a morning-opening and an afternoon-closing exchange-rate quote and assuming t h a t U.S. intervention occurs only i n the interim, this study attempts t o interpret the direction of causality between contemporary exchange-rate movements and intervention. The model a1 so includes a variable f o r foreign intervention and breaks U.S. intervention into purchases and sales of deutschemarks and purchases and sales of a l l other foreign currencies.
I I. Framework and Market Efficiency
Most economists regard foreign-exchange markets, l i k e other asset markets, as highly efficient. An e f f i c i e n t market "fully reflects" a l l relevant avail able information about today's events and about predictabl c future events, including pol icy decisions. Following Fama (1 970, , the exchange market a t any time, t, i s assumed to possess a s e t , 4 t, of a l l available information relevant t o exchange-rate determi nation. The conditional expectation of tomorrow's exchange rate can be expressed as: where E i s the expected-value operator, S i s the exchange rate, and 4 designates the change i n a variable. Assuming the exchange market is efficient:
That i s , the actual value of tomorrow's exchange rate i s not expected to deviate from the val ue predicted today, given al 1 avai l abl e information. Therefore:
where E(alt) = 0, from the assumption expressed i n equation 2. Finally, by substituting equation 1 into equation 3:
which implies t h a t the change i n the exchange rate from time t t o time t+l consists of an expected component, based on a11 information available a t time t, and an unexpected component. The market, however, could incorporate a l l relevant information available a t time t into St. In t h i s case, E(ASt+l ) = 0, and the exchange-rate series would resemble a random walk :
The information s e t , mt, will include information about U.S.
exchange-market intervention, at, which speci f i e s a reaction function for intervention. (The sets, @ and \, could be equal. ) Following the same arguments as were presented above, U.S. intervention (D) can be expressed as:
which implies t h a t the change i n U.S. intervention between time t and time t+l consists of an expected component based on the information s e t , \ t , and an unexpected component, aet9 that represents policy shocks. A similar expression can be derived for foreign intervention, R:
where Q*t i s the relevant information s e t contained i n (t.
The reaction functions f o r the U.S. and the foreign central banks could contain the same arguments; therefore, Dt could be correlated with Rt.
The sign of t h i s correlation indicates cooperation or competi tion between the two intervention authorities, while the magnitude suggests the intensity of the re1 ationship.
In a highly e f f i c i e n t exchange market, the participants learn t o anticipate systematic intervention and incorporate t h i s into thei r expectations of exchange-rate movements. Intervention coul d a1 t e r the anticipated exchange-rate path only by deviating from i t s normal behavior, or "shocking" the market. Such policies necessarily can be used only infrequently i f they are t o remain unpredictabl e. Moreover, a highly e f f i c i e n t market could quickly interpret such pol icy shocks and rapidly o f f s e t them when they terminate.
While exchange markets are highly efficient, they probably are not perfectly efficient. Information often i s costly to obtain and slow t o disseminate to a1 1 concerned parties. A consensual interpretation of events often forms rather slowly, The Federal Reserve and the Treasury m i g h t have b e t t e r information t h a n the market a t certain times, such as when -6-policymakers a r e considering a major change i n monetary o r f i s c a l policy, o r when international diplomatic re1 ations a r e strained. In the processing of normal information f l ows about real economic devel opments, prices, i n t e r e s t r a t e s , and routine pol icy, there i s 1 i t t l e reason to suspect t h a t pol icymakers a r e any b e t t e r informed than the market participants.
In summary, the f o l l owing general equations characterize a highly e f f i c i e n t exchange market:
Estimation
Using this general characterization of an e f f i c i e n t exchange market, we estimated a daily time-series model. The model incorporates both the New York morning-opening quote (9:30 am) and the New York afternoon-cl osing quote (4:30 pm). Obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the exchange-rate data a r e daily averages of the opening o r closing b i d and ask quotes f o r the deutschemark-do1 1 a r exchange rate. The deutschemark-do1 1 a r r a t e was chosen because of i t s importance i n exchange markets. There are 13 dates f o r which data were unavailable. These include Christmas and New Year's Day, on which no U.S. o r foreign intervention took place, and eight U.S. holidays on which no U.S. intervention occurred5 b u t on which foreign intervention is recorded. On the remaining three days, data f o r some of the exchange rates were missing. The blanks were f i l l e d w i t h the previous day's observation, because univariate Box-Jenkins analysis indicated t h a t the exchange-rate series foll owed a random-wal k and, consequently, t h a t today's rate i s the best guide of tomorrow's rate.
The Board of Governors maintains the daily intervention data used i n this analysis. The figures represent dollar purchases (+) o r sales (-1 i n units of $1 mil 1 ion made by the United States and ten other 1 arge developed countries.
There i s no standard criterion for defining intervention;
consequently, some disagreement exists over the cl assification of certain transactions. Some official dollar purchases might be omitted from the data because the transactions were not expressly undertaken t o a1 t e r the rate, even though they could have had that e f f e~t .~ Nevertheless, exchange-rate-stabil ization motives dominate movement i n the series. Briefly, a review of the autocorrelations and of the cross-correlations between pairs of these time series provided an i n i t i a l estimate of the structure of the model. Next, preliminary values were assigned to the parameters, and final values were jointly determined using approximate maximum-1 ikel i hood techniques. The structure of the model was modified, and the parameters re-estimated i f not a l l of the final values from the f i r s t pass were s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant, and/or significant autocorrelation remained i n the residual s.
Several considerations under1 i e the choice of the estimation technique employed i n t h i s study. First, i t provides a direct t e s t of the response of intervention t o exchange-rate movements and of the effect of intervention on the exchange rate. Unlike much of the recent l i t e r a t u r e t h a t seeks support for the portfol io-bal ance effect of intervention by testing f o r risk premia, t h i s work does not involve estimation of a joint hypothesis (see Loopesko   1983 ). W i t h respect t o t h i s issue, the resul t s can be unambiguously interpreted. Unfortunately, the estimation procedure does not expl ain -how intervention affects the exchange rate, only -i f intervention affects the rate.
The pol icy horizon adopted by the Federal Reserve for intervening to "calm disorderly markets" most often seems to be short-term .5 Since t h i s research investigates the short-term re1 ationships between intervention and exchange-rate movements, i t employs daily data. Although t e s t s on data of 1 ess frequency (weekly, monthly) can provide an approximation t o the short-run e f f e c t of intervention, such data lose information about the short-run relationships between exchange-rate movements and intervention. In August 1979, f o r example, monthly data reveal t h a t the Federal Reserve bought a moderate number of dollars. The System, however, actually sold do1 l a r s on every day t h a t i t intervened except on two nonconsecutive days; on these days, i t made large dollar purchases. Such daily variations contain much information about the causes and effects of intervention, b u t are "smoothed away" in l e s s frequent data.
A major reason for adopting the estimation technique employed here i s t h a t i t deals more explicitly than most of the existing l i t e r a t u r e w i t h the d i f f i c u l t causality problem i n t r i n s i c t o investigations of intervention and exchange-rate movements. Exchange-rate movements trigger intervention, b u t intervention influences exchange-rate movements. Causal i ty is bidirectional .
The ARIMA technique employed here provides a t e s t of causality broadly consistent with the time-speci f i c definition associated w i t h Granger (1 969). Empirical t e s t s using monthly or quarterly data, therefore, lose one month or one quarter of data because of the problem i n interpreting contemporaneous correlations. Daily data minimize t h i s problem, b u t since the issue of interpreting the contemporaneous correlation persists, t h i s study employs both a morning-opening exchange-rate quote and an afternoon-cl osing exchange-rate quote. On the assumption that U.S. intervention occurs a f t e r the morning-opening quote, b u t before the afternoon-closing quote, one can give a causal interpretation t o the estimated coefficients.
According t o t h i s definition
The ARIMA technique also converts the time-series data on intervention and exchange rates to a stationary process. Many studies do not take t h i s precaution; for example, using daily data, Wonnacott (1982) found lags i n the Federal Reserve's reaction to exchange-rate movements of 30 days and 90 days.
This resul t does not seem reasonable i n view of the short pol icy horizon of most intervention and could resul t from autocorrelation i n either the exchange rate or the intervention time series.
Finally, the ARI MA process allows the data t o determine the structure of the model. Besides deciding which variables to include, the time period t o consider, and the maximum lag length to t e s t , the analysis places no prior restrictions on the model. The ARIMA process also is compatible w i t h the notion of exchange markets as highly efficient; i t describes the model i n terms of a known and a random component. In t h i s model, lagged intervention terms do not appear d i r e c t l y i n e i t h e r of the exchange-rate equations, and 1 agged exchange r a t e s do not appear d i r e c t l y i n any of the intervention equations. This does not preclude interaction between the exchange r a t e and intervention. Such interaction i s contemporaneous and is contained i n the correlations between pairs of the ai t ( i = 1,2,3,4,5) shock terms. The ai terms have zero means, constant variances, and they contain no autocorrelation. Pairs of the a i t t e n s , however, are correlated a s shown i n table 2. All of these correlations a r e significant a t the 95 percent confidence 1 eve1 . The correl ations between the contemporaneous shock terms also are part of t h i s model and convey important information about intervention and the exchange rate.
One shortcoming of the model i s t h a t underlying the estimation technique i s the assumption t h a t the exchange rate and intervention
The problem, however, i s to determine the direction of causality underlying the contemporaneous correlations. Consider the contemporaneous correlation between the unanticipated movements i n the morning-opening exchange-rate quote, al t, and unanticipated U. S. intervention i n the deutschemark-do1 l a r market, a3t; i t is negative and moderately strong. Is the negative correlation between these terms evidence of a 1 eaning-against-the-wind intervention strategy (causal i ty from al to a3t), or i s i t evidence of a perverse exchange-rate response to intervention (causality from agt to a l t ) ? Because a l t represents unanticipated movements i n the morning-opening quote (SAM 1, and because U. S. intervention occurs a f t e r the market's opening, we assume t h a t causality runs from al t o a3t* Figure 1 i l l ustrates the assumed direction of causal i ty among the contemporaneous shock terms. W e assume t h a t U.S. intervention, both DDM and DOT, ends a t the closing of the market, so t h a t causality runs from agt and aqt to aZt, w i t h no feedback from aZt. W e also assume that unanticipated foreign intervention i n the dollar market, agt, affects the afternoon-closing exc a 2 t ' b u t we are uncertain of the predominant d i rection of causal i ty between agt and al t. Although the foreign market opens before the New York market, the New York market i s open before the European market closes, and exchange-rate movements i n the U.S. market can influence foreign intervention. Feedback, therefore, i s highly 1 ikely between al and agt. W e a1 so cannot speci fy causal re1 ationshi ps among the intervention terms, a3t, aqt, and a g t Finally, i t seems reasonable t h a t unanticipated movements i n the morning-opening quote, al t, could influence movements i n the afternoon-closing quote, aZt.
Using these assumptions and following a procedure suggested by Sims, one can incorporate the information contained i n the contemporaneous shock terms directly into the model. W e hypothesize:
where al and agt are exogenous variables, where the Q i ( i = 1,2,3,4,5) terms are "white noise," and where the remaining right-hand variables "cause" the appropriate left-hand variable. Equations 13 through 17 were rewritten i n matrix form:
where C i s a matrix of the relevant parameters, A i s a matrix of the i n i t i a l ait shock terms, and a i s a matrix of shock terms a f t e r removing the relevant cross-correlations. W e estimated the parameters i n the C matrix, using ordinary l e a s t squares, and inverted the resulting C matrix t o yield:
The estimates f o r equations 14 through 16 are:
where a l l estimated parameters are significant a t the 95 percent confidence level. In previous regressions the coefficient, cZ4 (suggested i n equation 14), was not significantly different from zero, so i t was omitted from equation 18. Tab1 e 3 shows the remaining cross-correlations between pairs of u i t terms. Equations 13, 17, 18, 19 , and 20 can be s u b s t i t u t e d back i n t o equations 8 ' through 1 2 ' t o incorporate t h e e f f e c t s of contemporaneous i n t e r v e n t i o n and exc hange-rate movements d i r e c t l y i n the model :
21. SAMt = 1.000124 SPMt -+alt9 22. SPMt = 0.999883 SPMt -+ 0.69391 a -0.00001 1 a 3t -0.000004 a + a 2t, Equation 21 describes the morning-opening exchange r a t e (SAM) as approximately equal t o t h e previous day's c l o s i n g quote (SPM) p l u s an u n a n t i c i pated component, t. The alt component remains c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e u n a n t i c i p a t e d component f o r f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n (a suggesting some i n t e r a c t i o n between the morning-opening exchange r a t e and f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n (see tab1 e 3). Because t h e causal re1 a t i o n s h i p i s b i d i r e c t i o n a l , i t c o u l d n o t be incorporated d i r e c t l y i n t o the model .
Equation 22 re1 ates t h e afternoon-exchange-rate quote (SPMt) t p i t s previous day's value and t o shock terms associated w i t h the morning-opening quote (a t), U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n against deutschemark (a and f o r e i g n do1 l a r i n t e r v e n t i o n (a 5t 1. I g n o r i n g momentarily t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n terms, one coul d i n t e r p r e t t h i s equation i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: i n an e f f i c i e n t market, one expects t h e afternoon quote t o equal the morning quote p l u s an u n a n t i c i p a t e d component. Simi 1 a r l y , t h a t morning's quote shoul d equal t h e previous day's c l o s i n g quote p l u s a random component. The program, however, t r e a t s SPMt and S poraneous terms, even though SAMt occurs b e f o r e SPMt. Tim n a l y s i s does n o t admi contemporaneous variables i n equations, because i t s primary objective i s to forecast and, i n a s t a t i s t i c a l sense, a l l contemporaneous terms and t h e i r interactions are unknown a t time period, t. Any interaction among the contemporaneous terms not reflected by lagged terms i s reflected i n the correlations among the shock terms, and we have exploited t h i s information as discussed above. Equation 22, therefore, relates SPMt t o SPMt-l, h u t SPMt -equals SAMt plus a random term and, therefore, the information 
IV. Conclusion
This paper has presented a time-series analysis of the relationships among daily deutschemark-do1 1 a r exchange rates and daily U. S. and foreign intervention from November 2, 1978 , through October 31, 1979 . The results suggest rvention reacted without a lag t o unanticipated changes in the morning-opening exchange rate in a manner consistent with a leaning-against-the-wind strategy. Such a strategy would tend t o dampen exchange-rate fluctuations i f i t actually influenced the exchange rate i n the appropriate direction.
The results, however, do not indicate t h a t intervention, a s conducted over t h i s period, was effective i n changing the exchange rate i n the desired direction. The signs on the intervention terms in the closing-quote exchange-rate equation suggest t h a t U.S. and foreign intervention accentuated movements i n the exchange rate. The size of t h i s impact, however, was very small .
The response of the exchange rate to intervention seems perverse from the perspective of the central bank, b u t could be rational from the perspective of private exchange-market partici pants. Forei gn-exchange traders coul d view central -bank intervention as a signal that the currency being purchased is fundamental ly weak, and they could react to intervention by s e l l ing that currency. According to one anonymous foreign-exchange trader:
There's an adage i n the marketplace that says one should always go against an intervention, since any intervention reflects an inherent weakness i n the currency being supported. bill ion over the period studied.
A1 though t h i s study used daily data, the impact of intervention could die out too quickly t o be picked up i n the closing exchange-rate quote. A one-shot purchase of dollars could cause the dollar t o appreciate for only a few hours, especially i f the market is highly e f f i c i e n t and especially i f exchange traders sense the Federal Reserve's presence i n the market.
A 1 though the results of t h i s study suggest t h a t intervention d i d not a1 t e r
the exchange rate i n a direction consistent w i t h central bank objectives, they do not entirely preclude the use of sterilized intervention as an effective pol icy tool. Over the period studied, intervention was conducted frequently, and the objectives of intervention were announced on November 1 , 1978. The market probably was well aware of the Federal Reserve's presence i n the market. I t is s t i l l possibl e that s t e r i l ized intervention, used periodically i n a method that surprises the market, can be an effective short-term policy tool for influencing the exchange rate. The results of t h i s study seem, therefore, to support the Treasury's March 1981 decision to use intervention very sparingly.
Final ly, some countries, especi a1 l y the United Kingdom, frequently intervene in small amounts t o monitor the exchange market. Such intervention is more to gather information than t o influence the exchange rate. 
